urma: Eyewitness Accounts of Abuses in Eastern Fighting

Burma: Eyewitness Accounts of Abuses in Eastern Fighting

(New York) – The Burmese armed forces and ethnic insurgents should act to protect civilians as fighting in eastern Burma intensifies, Human Rights Watch said today. The Burmese army, or Tatmadaw, has conducted a major build up in the East following an attack and brief seizure of the border town of Myawaddy by ethnic Karen rebels on the date of the elections, November 7, 2010.

“The recent elections in Burma have done nothing to change Burmese army tactics of terrorizing civilians with indiscriminate shelling, abusive sweeps, and forced labor in the country’s long-running civil war,” said Elaine Pearson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Sadly, so far neither side in the recent fighting has shown much regard for the civilians caught in the crossfire.”

Human Rights Watch said that the Thai government and military should expand efforts to provide protection in Thailand to Burmese refugees affected by the fighting, and called on Thai authorities to stop pressuring refugees to prematurely return to Burma, where they may be caught in the fighting or subjected to human rights abuses.

Fighting in the East since November has caused more than 20,000 Burmese to flee across several points along the border with Thailand. While many of those refugees returned within days, refugees continue to flee renewed fighting near the border.

On November 7, forces of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) attacked and occupied the town of Myawaddy, before withdrawing on November 8 after a Burmese army counter-attack caused more than 12,000 people to flee across the border into Mae Sot town in Thailand’s Tak province. On November 27, the Burmese army Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 230 launched attacks against DKBA units holding the town of Palu, less than 20 kilometers from Mae Sot.

Fighting at several other points along the border since November 7 has caused a number of refugee flows. Several thousand people fled into Thailand to escape fighting at Burma’s Three Pagoda’s Pass, on the border with Thailand’s Kanchanaburi province. Sporadic fighting since then has displaced these communities several times, particularly around the town of Waw Lay, 70 kilometers south of Mae Sot, where thousands of people have crossed.

Refugees interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Thailand expressed fears of being caught in the crossfire, as much of the fighting is taking place in populated towns. In some areas – including Palu, Waw Lay, and Phayathonzu – it appeared that troops on both sides were indiscriminately firing mortars at civilian houses, or were not taking all feasible precautions to avoid civilian casualties, as required under the laws of war.

Refugees also said they feared being taken as forced labor porters by the Burmese army, and in some cases by the DKBA and another rebel force, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). Civilians also said they feared being used to guide troops through terrain, often acting as human minesweepers, a practice the Burmese army has used in past military operations.

Thai Authorities Pressuring Refugees to Return
The Thai authorities have repeatedly sent back to Burma several hundred ethnic Burman and Karen civilians who fled from Palu and surrounding villages, raising concerns for their safety. For instance, refugees who fled to Thailand on November 27 and received assistance from Thai authorities were only permitted to stay in Thailand for one night before being compelled to return to Burma the next day. Amidst intensified fighting on November 29, some fled back to Thailand – and were again permitted to stay for one day before Thai authorities sent them back to Burma a second time. When fighting flared again on November 30, the cycle occurred a third time – temporary stay, and then forced return to Burma. Human Rights Watch interviewed several refugees taking shelter in Thailand who all said they were too afraid to return to Burma under current conditions.

“Rather than being provided consistent protection, people fleeing conflict in Burma are being treated like human pingpong balls – reluctantly allowed into Thailand when fighting flares, but then returned to Burma at the first sign of quiet,” Pearson said. “Thailand should not return refugees until the risk to them in Burma truly ends, but should allow them to stay in safe areas away from the border with access to protection services and assistance from humanitarian agencies.”

Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, but under customary international law the Thai government has an obligation of nonrefoulement (non-return) of persons to places where their life or freedom is at risk. International law also obliges Thailand to allow asylum seekers access to Thai territory to seek asylum.

Human Rights Watch called on the Thai government to permit refugees to seek asylum in Thailand and to remain there until they are convinced it is safe to return to Burma. Thai authorities should work closely with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to engage in proper screening of refugees and follow UNHCR’s guidelines on voluntary returns. At several points, Thai authorities have prematurely forced civilians to return to Burma, only for them to return as soon as fighting resumed.

The recent fighting is also a stark reminder of the urgency to support a United Nations commission of inquiry into crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by all parties to Burma’s long-running civil war, Human Rights Watch said. UN Special Rapporteur for the Situation of Human Rights in Burma, Tomas Ojea Quintana, repeated his call for a commission of inquiry in his October report to the UN General Assembly. To date, 13 countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, have publicly announced support for an international inquiry.

“A UN commission of inquiry would be an important deterrent to abuses by all parties to Burma’s conflict,” Pearson said. “Otherwise the atrocities of the past may continue in the future.”

Eyewitness Accounts From Burmese Refugees in Thailand

“The mortar shells landed everywhere [during fighting on November 30], very close to my house. I was hiding under a tree. Both sides [the Tatmadaw and DKBA] were shooting; the fighting was right in the town [Palu]. Most of the Burmese mortar shells landed in the village, even though there DKBA were hiding at the edge of the village at the temple. The fighting has happened so many times lately. Last week I was taken as a porter by the DKBA for one day, but they let me go and told me to flee with my family because the Burmese were coming. I have never been taken as a porter by the Burmese army; I always run away. Yesterday the Burmese came to the area to take porters, and as we were running away from them they shot at us. One man was killed, and another was shot in the leg. All the people ran away. The Burmese want to control everyone and everything.”
– Farmer, age 25, from Palu, Karen State, Burma

“The Burmese soldiers came to my village; everyone else had run away. They ordered me to show them the way to one of their bases; they didn’t know where it was. I had to walk ahead of them. I was very afraid of stepping on a landmine, but I was afraid of them [Burmese soldiers]; they will beat me if I don’t do it. I got lost at one point, I wasn’t sure of the way, and one of the sergeants pointed his gun and yelled, ‘I will kill you!’ They let me go after I showed them to the camp near Palu.”
-Village leader, 53, near Palu

“I was called with others to carry the Burmese wounded [after an ambush]. There were five wounded and four dead. They buried the dead ones there. They told us to bring hoes and shovels for that. I carried one of the wounded soldiers to Palu town for one hour. I was afraid to carry them – I was scared there would be another attack on the way, either the DKBA or KNLA would ambush all of us. It is not safe to go back, I am afraid to be taken as a porter for the Burmese.”
– Karen laborer, 30, from Palu town

“The day before we were sent back the first time, we told the Thai [army] we were too afraid to go back, but they sent us back. As soon as we arrived [back in Palu in Burma], the fighting started again and we fled back to Thailand. I don’t know why they are doing this, sending us back and forth again and again.”
-Woman, 65, from Palu town

Background
The escalation of fighting in ethnic areas of Burma, where civil war has persisted for decades in Karen, Karenni, and Shan States, has various causes. More than 17 ethnic armed groups throughout Burma agreed to ceasefires with the central government between 1989 and 1995. Many of these ceasefires are now looking increasingly tenuous after relations between the groups and the government deteriorated since 2007 over political reforms and the lack of concessions to ethnic nationality aspirations.

In 2008, Burma’s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) announced that all armed groups under ceasefires would have to transform into Border Guard Forces (BGF) under the direct operational control of the Tatmadaw, as stipulated in the 2008 Constitution. To date, only five small militias have agreed to the terms and transformed into BGFs. Large ethnic armed groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), and the New Mon State Party (NMSP), have refused to join the BGF scheme.

The DKBA, a splinter group from the larger Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army, agreed to transform into a Karen State BGF in September 2010. One brigade of the DKBA, under the leadership of Brigadier Nah Kham Wey, refused to sign onto the BGF scheme. It was this unit that occupied the town of Myawaddy on November 7, leading to fighting breaking out the following day in that town and further south at Three Pagoda’s Pass. The Tatmadaw have since been hunting down the DKBA faction, sparking sporadic fighting along the border. There are reports that elements of the KNLA are also attacking Burmese military forces as they attempt to move large numbers of troops and supplies into the area.

In 2009, Burmese security forces stormed the ceasefire enclave of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, which caused over 30,000 refugees to flee into China. The tensions with the ceasefire groups is set to continue in 2011, as fighting has also flared in parts of Shan State against the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), parts of which have agreed to the BGF scheme.

Topics: Karen, Security situation, Military operations, Elections, Civil war, Refugees, Protection of civilian persons in time of war, Forced return, Resistance movements, Militias, Armed forces/military,

Copyright notice: © Copyright 1992-2010, Human Rights Watch

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d01de46c.html

Next two months crucial for Myanmar’s political future, warns Secretary-General

The next two months will be crucial for Myanmar, potentially determining its political future and its place in the international community, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned today, citing the unsatisfactory nature of recent elections and the need to include those who were excluded.

In a meeting with the so-called Group of Friends on Myanmar, comprising more than a dozen nations and regional blocs supporting his good offices mandate in the South-East Asian country, Mr. Ban stressed that for any transition to succeed, it must involve not only those who participated and won seats in the election, but also those who did not or could not, and this must include the release of political prisoners.

“Looking ahead, we need to keep encouraging the authorities to take steps to make the political transition broad-based and inclusive,” spokesman Martin Nesirky quoted him as saying.

The meeting – which was briefed by Mr. Ban’s Special Adviser on Myanmar, Vijay Nambiar, who has just returned from talks with the country’s leaders and a broad range of civil society – called on the authorities to achieve this by building on recent developments, including through the specific steps proposed by the United Nations.

Mr. Ban noted that addressing concerns about the credibility of the transition process to date is also essential for any next steps to succeed, stressing that “regrettably, the conduct of the elections was far below the international community’s expectations.”

The meeting highlighted the need for greater international consensus towards Myanmar, endorsing a comprehensive UN engagement in the political, humanitarian and development areas, in parallel and with equal attention.

Mr. Nambiar, who is also Mr. Ban’s Chief of Staff, briefed the Security Council today in a closed session on his visit, during which he met with recently released Nobel Peace Prize laureate and pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, whose National League for Democracy (NLD) won the last elections, later invalidated by the country’s rulers, two decades ago but was barred from participating this time.

He also met with representatives of some of the major political parties who participated in the recent polls and members of civil society groups.

Topics: Political situation, Elections, Democracy,

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2010 Report on International Religious Freedom – Burma

2010 Report on International Religious Freedom – Burma

[Covers the period from July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010]

Highly repressive, authoritarian military regimes have ruled the country since 1962. The government imposed restrictions on certain religious activities and limited freedom of religion, although generally permitted adherents of government-registered religious groups to worship as they chose. According to the government, a 2008 nationwide referendum approved a new draft Constitution. The government was preparing for November 7, 2010 elections, the first elections since 1990, after which the new constitution would go into effect. Democracy activists and the international community widely criticized the constitutional referendum and election preparations as seriously flawed.

There was no change in the government’s limited degree of respect for religious freedom during the reporting period. Religious activities and organizations were subject to restrictions on freedom of expression, association, and assembly. The government continued to monitor meetings and activities of virtually all organizations, including religious organizations, and required religious groups to seek permission from authorities before holding any large public event. The government continued to systematically restrict Buddhist clergy efforts to promote human rights and political freedom. Many of the Buddhist monks arrested in the violent crackdown that followed prodemocracy demonstrations in September 2007, including prominent activist monk U Gambira, remained in prison serving long sentences. The government also actively promoted Theravada Buddhism over other religions, particularly among ethnic minorities. Christian and Islamic groups continued to struggle to obtain permission to repair places of worship or build new ones. The regime continued to closely monitor Muslim activities. Restrictions on worship for other non-Buddhist minority groups also continued. Although there were no new reports of forced conversions of non-Buddhists, authorities in some cases influenced placement of orphans and homeless youth, preferring Buddhist monasteries to Christian orphanages in an apparent effort to prevent Christian groups’ or missionaries’ influence. Adherence or conversion to Buddhism was an unwritten prerequisite for promotion to senior government and military ranks. All senior level officers of the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and the armed forces are Buddhists.

During the reporting period, social tensions continued between the Buddhist majority and the Christian and Muslim minorities. Widespread prejudice existed against citizens of South Asian origin, many of whom are Muslims. The government continued to refuse to recognize the Muslim Rohingya ethnic minority as citizens and imposed restrictions on their movement and marriage.

The U.S. government advocated religious freedom with all sectors of society, including government officials, religious leaders, private citizens, scholars, diplomats of other governments, and international business and media representatives. Embassy representatives offered support to local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and religious leaders, including through small grants and training programs, and relayed information to otherwise isolated human rights NGOs and religious leaders. Since 1999, the U.S. Secretary of State has designated Burma as a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act for particularly severe violations of religious freedom. The U.S. government has a wide array of sanctions in place against the country for its violations of human rights.

Section I. Religious Demography

The country has an area of 261,970 square miles. The Human Development Report under the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International Monetary Fund estimate the country’s population to be 50 million. Buddhism coexists with astrology, numerology, fortune telling, and veneration of indigenous pre-Buddhist era deities called “nats.” Buddhist monks, including novices, number more than 400,000 and depend on the laity for their material needs, including clothing and daily donations of food; Buddhist nuns are fewer in number. The principal minority religious groups include Christians (primarily Baptists, Roman Catholics, and Anglicans, along with several small Protestant denominations), Muslims (mostly Sunni), Hindus, and practitioners of traditional Chinese and indigenous religions. According to official statistics, almost 90 percent of the population practices Buddhism, 4 percent Christianity, and 4 percent Islam. These statistics almost certainly underestimated the non-Buddhist proportion of the population. Independent researchers placed the Muslim population at between 6 and 10 percent. A small Jewish community in Rangoon has a synagogue but no resident rabbi.

The country is ethnically diverse, with some correlation between ethnicity and religion. Theravada Buddhism is the dominant religion among the majority Burman ethnic group and also among the Shan, Arakanese, and Mon ethnic minorities. Christianity is dominant among the Kachin, Chin, and Naga ethnic groups. Protestant Christian groups reported recent rapid growth among animist communities in Chin State. Christianity also is practiced widely among the Karen and Karenni ethnic groups, although many Karen and Karenni are Buddhist and some Karen are Muslim. Citizens of Indian origin, who are concentrated in major cities and in the south central region, predominantly practice Hinduism or Islam, although some are Christian. Islam is practiced widely in Rakhine State and in Rangoon, Irrawaddy, Magwe, and Mandalay Divisions, where some Burmese, Indians, and ethnic Bengalis practice the religion. Chinese ethnic minorities generally practice traditional Chinese religions. Traditional indigenous beliefs are practiced widely among smaller ethnic groups in the highland regions. Practices drawn from those indigenous beliefs persist in popular Buddhist rituals, especially in rural areas.

Section II. Status of Government Respect for Religious Freedom

Legal/Policy Framework

Highly authoritarian military regimes have ruled the country since 1962. The current military government, the SPDC, has governed without a constitution or legislature since 1988, although in a 2008 referendum that most observers believe was fundamentally flawed, the SPDC engineered a 92 percent approval rating for a new constitution that is slated to take effect after a parliament is seated following November 2010 elections. Since independence in 1948, many ethnic minority areas have served as bases for armed resistance against the government. Despite cease-fire agreements with many armed ethnic groups after 1989, Shan, Karen, and Karenni insurgencies have continued. The government has tended to view religious freedom in the context of potential threats to national unity or central authority.

Most adherents of government-recognized religious groups generally were allowed to worship as they chose; however, the government imposed restrictions on certain religious activities and frequently limited religious freedom. Antidiscrimination laws do not apply to ethnic groups not formally recognized under the 1982 Citizenship Law, such as the Muslim Rohingyas in northern Rakhine State.

In addition the constitution forbids the “abuse of religion for political purposes.” The law criminalizes the “defamation” of religion for political purposes. The regime commonly employed nonreligious laws to target those involved in religious and political activism, including the Electronic Transactions Act, Immigration Act, and Unlawful Associations Act.

The law bars members of religious orders from running for public office. Laws published in March 2010 in preparation for November 7 elections also barred members from Buddhist, Christian, and Hindu religious orders (such as priests, monks, and nuns) from voting and joining political parties, as did laws for past elections. The new laws do not mention Muslims.

Although the country has no official state religion, the government continued to show a preference for Theravada Buddhism through official propaganda and state support, including donations to monasteries and pagodas, encouragement of education at Buddhist monastic schools, and support for Buddhist missionary activities. In practice promotions to senior positions within the military and civil service were reserved for Buddhists.

State-controlled media frequently depicted government officials and family members paying homage to Buddhist monks; offering donations at pagodas; officiating at ceremonies to open, improve, restore, or maintain pagodas; and organizing ostensibly voluntary “people’s donations” of money, food, and uncompensated labor to build or refurbish Buddhist shrines nationwide. State-owned newspapers routinely featured front-page banner slogans quoting from Buddhist scriptures. The government has published books of Buddhist religious instruction.

The government restricted the activities and expression of the Buddhist clergy (Sangha), although some monks have resisted such control. Based on the 1990 Sangha Organization Law, the government has banned any organization of Buddhist monks other than the nine state-recognized monastic orders. Violations of this ban were punishable by immediate public defrocking and criminal penalties. The nine recognized orders submit to the authority of the State Monk Coordination Committee (“Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee” or SMNC), the members of which were indirectly elected by monks.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs’ Department for the Perpetuation and Propagation of the Sasana oversees the government’s relations with Buddhist monks and schools. The government continued to fund two state Sangha universities in Rangoon and Mandalay that trained Buddhist monks under the purview of the SMNC. The state-funded International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University in Rangoon, which opened in 1998, has a stated purpose “to share the country’s knowledge of Buddhism with the people of the world.”

Buddhist doctrine remained part of the state-mandated curriculum in all government-run elementary schools. Students at these schools could opt out of instruction in Buddhism and sometimes did, but all were required to recite a Buddhist prayer daily. Some schools or teachers may allow Muslim students to leave the classroom during this recitation, but there did not appear to be a centrally mandated exemption for non-Buddhist students.

The government observes the following religious holidays as national holidays: the Full Moon Day of Tabaung, the four-day Thingyan (Water Festival), Buddhist New Year’s Day, the Full Moon Day of Kason, the Full Moon Day of Waso, the Full Moon Day of Thadinkyut, the Full Moon Day of Tazaungmone, Christmas, and Deepa Vali.

Since the 1960s Christian and Islamic groups have had difficulty importing religious literature. All publications, religious and secular, remained subject to censorship and other controls. In December 2009 six Muslims were arrested for distributing an Islamic newsletter without approval. It is illegal to import translations of the Bible in indigenous languages. Officials have occasionally allowed local printing or photocopying of limited quantities of religious materials, including the Qur’an (with the notation that they are for private use only) in indigenous languages without approval by government censors.

Religious organizations were not required to register with the government, but if the religious organization wanted to engage in certain activities (religious education, etc), it must get government permission.

The government discouraged proselytizing by non-Buddhist clergy. These restrictions most affected some Christian denominations and Islam. The government generally has not allowed permanent foreign religious groups to operate since the mid-1960s when it expelled nearly all foreign missionaries and nationalized almost all private schools and hospitals. The government was not known to have paid any compensation in connection with these extensive confiscations.

Citizens and permanent residents were required to carry government issued National Registration Cards (NRCs) that often indicated religious affiliation and ethnicity. There appeared to be no consistent criteria governing whether a person’s religion was indicated on the card. Citizens also were required to indicate their religion on certain official application forms for documents such as passports, although passports themselves do not indicate the bearer’s religion. Members of many ethnic and religious minorities faced problems obtaining NRCs, Muslims even more than others.

Restrictions on Religious Freedom

The government selectively enforced legal restrictions on religious freedom. During the reporting period, the SPDC continued to rule by decree and was not bound by any constitutional or statutory provision concerning discrimination based on religion, race, gender, disability, language, or social status. (The new constitution was not yet in force and was slated to take effect only after elections planned for November 7, 2010.) Religious organizations were subject to restrictions on freedom of expression and association. The government’s pervasive internal security apparatus imposed implicit restrictions on collective and individual worship through infiltrating and monitoring meetings and activities of virtually all organizations. The government subjected all media, including religious publications, and on occasion sermons, to censorship and other controls and at times interfered with religious gatherings.

Churches in Chin state often needed to request permission to hold religious ceremonies two to three months in advance, although authorities generally approved these requests.

Authorities frequently refused to approve requests for gatherings to celebrate traditional Christian and Islamic holidays and restricted the number of Muslims who could gather in one place. For instance, in satellite towns surrounding Rangoon, Muslims were only allowed to gather for worship and religious training during major Muslim holidays. During the reporting period, mosques in Mandalay and Rangoon were restricted from using a loudspeaker for the Azan (call to prayer). The government-cited reason for this restriction was that it would upset Buddhist monks.

The government continued to discriminate against minority religious groups, restricting educational activities, proselytizing, and restoration or construction of churches and mosques. Christian and Muslim groups reported authorities still had not granted permission to rebuild churches and mosques destroyed by Cyclone Nargis in 2008; they were only allowed to make minor repairs to structures that were damaged.

Government authorities continued to prohibit Christian clergy from proselytizing in some areas. Christian groups reported that authorities sometimes refused residency permits for Christian ministers attempting to move to new townships; they indicated this was not a widespread practice, but depended on the individual community and local authority. Nonetheless, Christian groups reported that church membership increased, even in predominantly Buddhist regions.

Government censors continued to enforce restrictions on local publication of the Bible, Qur’an, and other Christian and Islamic texts. The most onerous restriction was a list of more than 100 prohibited words the censors would not allow in Christian or Islamic literature, forbidden as “indigenous terms” or derived from the Pali language long used in Buddhist literature. Some Christian and Islamic groups in the country have used these words since the colonial period. Some Muslim organizations, which translated and published non-Buddhist religious texts, appealed the restrictions although government authorities have not responded to the appeals. In addition censors sometimes objected to passages of the Bible’s Old Testament and the Qur’an that they interpreted as endorsing violence against nonbelievers.

Authorities restricted the quantity of imported Bibles and Qur’ans, although individuals continued to bring them into the country in small quantities for personal use. There were no reports that authorities confiscated Bibles or Qur’ans at border entry points.

Some Christian theological seminaries and Bible schools continued to operate, along with several Islamic madrassahs. Some of these institutions did not register with the Myanmar Council of Churches, an alliance of some major churches in the country, but were able to conduct affairs without government interference. The government allowed some members of foreign religious groups to enter the country to provide humanitarian assistance, as it had done after Cyclone Nargis in May 2008.

Muslims across the country, as well as ethnic Chinese and Indians, often were required to obtain permission from township authorities to leave their hometowns. Authorities generally did not grant permission to Rohingya or other Muslims living in Rakhine to travel for any purpose; however, permission was sometimes obtained through bribery. Muslims in other regions were granted more freedom to travel, but still faced restrictions. Muslims residing in Rangoon could visit beach resort areas in Thandwe, Rakhine state, but could not return to Rangoon without the signature of the Regional Military Commander. Muslims residing outside Rakhine state often were barred from return travel to their homes if they visited parts of Rakhine state.

Muslims in Rakhine state, particularly those of the Rohingya minority group, continued to experience the severest forms of legal, economic, educational, and social discrimination. The government denied citizenship status to Rohingyas, claiming that their ancestors did not reside in the country at the start of British colonial rule, as the 1982 citizenship law required. The Rohingya asserted that their presence in the area predates the British arrival by several centuries. In November 2008 the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged the government to review its citizenship law. In February 2010 the UN special rapporteur for human rights in the country visited and noted discrimination against Muslims. Many of the approximately 28,500 Rohingya Muslims registered in two refugee camps in Bangladesh and the estimated 200,000 Rohingya Muslims living outside those camps refused to return to the country because they feared human rights abuses, including religious persecution.

Although essentially treated as illegal foreigners, Rohingya were not issued Foreigner Registration Cards (FRCs). Since they also were not generally eligible for NRCs, Rohingya have been commonly referred to as “stateless.” The government continued a program with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that issued Temporary Registration Cards (TRCs) to stateless persons in northern Rakhine State, the majority of whom are Rohingyas. UNHCR worked with approximately 750,000 residents of Rakhine state who do not hold citizenship in the country. At the end of the reporting period, the government estimated that 85 percent of eligible residents (637,500 stateless persons) over the age of 10 possessed TRCs.

Without citizenship status Rohingyas did not have access to secondary education in state-run schools. Those Muslim students from Rakhine state who completed high school were not permitted to travel outside the state to attend college or university. Authorities continued to bar from graduating Muslim university students who did not possess NRCs. These students were permitted to attend classes and sit for examinations, but they could not receive diplomas unless they claimed a “foreign” ethnic minority affiliation. Rohingyas also were unable to obtain employment in any civil service positions. Rohingya couples must also obtain government permission to marry.

Newcomers who were Muslim were not allowed to buy property or reside in Thandwe, Rakhine State. Authorities did not permit Muslims to live in Gwa or Taungup in the state.

The government allowed members of all religious groups to establish and maintain links with coreligionists in other countries and to travel abroad for religious purposes, subject to the restrictive passport and visa issuance practices, foreign exchange controls, and government monitoring, which extended to all international activities by all citizens regardless of religion. The government sometimes expedited its burdensome passport issuance procedures for Muslims making the Hajj or Buddhists going on pilgrimage to Bodhgaya, India. Approximately 1,500 Buddhists made pilgrimages to Bodhgaya in 2009.

The Central Executive Committee of the National League for Democracy (NLD), the largest opposition group, did not include non-Buddhists, although there was widespread support for the NLD among most religious groups. The government discouraged Muslims from enlisting in the military, and Christian or Muslim military officers who aspired to promotion beyond the rank of major were encouraged by their superiors to convert to Buddhism. Some Muslims who wished to join the military reportedly had to list “Buddhist” as their religion on their applications, although they were not required to convert.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs has stipulated in the past that permission to construct or repair religious buildings “depends upon the population of the location”; however, there appeared to be no correlation between the construction of pagodas and the demand for additional places of Buddhist worship. The government openly supported Buddhist seminaries and permitted them to construct large campuses. Buddhist groups generally have not experienced difficulty in obtaining permission to build new pagodas, monasteries, or community religious halls.

In most regions Christian and Islamic groups that sought to build small places of worship on side streets or other inconspicuous locations were able to do so only with informal approval from local authorities. When local authorities or conditions changed, approvals have been rescinded and, in some cases, authorities have demolished existing religious buildings. Formal requests encountered long delays, generally were denied, and even when approved could subsequently be reversed by a more senior authority.

Christian groups continued to have trouble obtaining permission to buy land or build new churches in most regions. In some cases authorities refused because they claimed the churches did not possess property deeds, but access to land title was extremely difficult due to the complex land law and because the government holds title to most land. In some areas permission to repair existing places of worship was easier to acquire. In Chin State authorities have not granted permission to build a new church since 2003.

It remained extremely difficult for Muslims to acquire permission to build new, or repair existing, mosques, although internal renovations were allowed in some cases. Historic mosques in Mawlamyine, Mon State and Sittwe, Rakhine State, as well as other areas, continued to deteriorate because authorities would not allow routine maintenance. A number of restrictions were in place on the construction or renovation of mosques and religious schools in northern Rakhine State. In some parts of Rakhine State, authorities cordoned off mosques and forbade Muslims to worship in them. Border security forces continued to conduct arbitrary “inspections” of mosques in northern Rakhine State, demanding that mosque officials show permits to operate the mosques.

In the wake of Cyclone Nargis, authorities permitted the caretaker of Rangoon’s only synagogue to repair storm damage and restore other parts of the building.

Abuses of Religious Freedom

The government continued its efforts to control the Buddhist clergy (Sangha). It tried Sangha members for “activities inconsistent with and detrimental to Buddhism” and imposed on the Sangha a code of conduct enforced by criminal penalties. The government arrested and imprisoned politically active Buddhist monks. In prison monks were defrocked and treated as laypersons. In general they were not allowed to shave their heads and were not given food compatible with the monastic code. They were often beaten and forced to do hard labor.

The government also subjected the Sangha to special restrictions on freedom of expression and association. Members of the Sangha were not allowed to preach sermons pertaining to politics. Religious lectures could not contain any words, phrases, or stories reflecting political views. The regime told Sangha members to distance themselves from politics, political parties, or members of political parties. The government prohibited any organization of the Sangha other than the nine monastic orders that fall under the authority of the State Clergy Coordination Committee. The government prohibited all clergy from being members of any political party and electoral law bars them from voting in the elections planned for November 7, 2010.

According to the Thailand-based Assistance Association of Political Prisoners in Burma (AAPP), at the end of the reporting period approximately 252 monks were imprisoned, many of them arrested after the September 2007 peaceful prodemocracy demonstrations. During the reporting period, the government transferred some of the monks, as well as other political prisoners, to remote jails away from their family members, limiting their access to basic necessities and medicines that visiting relatives generally provided.

The government took no action to investigate or punish those responsible for extrajudicial killings of at least 30 persons during the regime’s violent suppression of the September 2007 demonstrations. The government did not investigate reports that security forces took large numbers of residents and monks from their homes and monasteries during numerous nighttime raids following the protests.

AAPP estimated that security forces raided at least 52 monasteries between September 26 and December 31, 2007, in retaliation for the monk-led demonstrations. Opposition activists and members of the clergy reported soldiers forcibly entered the monasteries at night and deployed tear gas, fired rubber bullets, and beat monks with batons and bamboo sticks. International NGOs estimated that at least 150 monks were arrested between September and October 2007.

According to exile press reports, in December 2009 police arrested monk Ashin Uk Kong Sah for writing “no 2010 election” along a highway. Authorities reportedly have not told relatives and friends where he is being detained or the crime with which he has been charged.

According to a September 2009 Human Rights Watch report, monk U Sandar Dika told his family that he was tortured while under interrogation following his August 2009 arrest.

On April 22, 2009 authorities arrested NLD members U Chit Phay and U Aung Soe Wai from Twuntay Township at their homes after the two led a prayer meeting for the release of activist leader Aung San Suu Kyi. At the end of the reporting period, they were still in prison.

Human rights observers believed the leader of Maggin Monastery, Sayada Aindakaat, remained in detention, as did other monks arrested in 2007, including U Sanda Wara.

On January 28, 2009, prison officials reportedly ordered an inmate to beat monk U Kelatha at Henzada Prison, Irrawaddy Division, for wearing his prison uniform in the style of monk robes. Authorities had arrested U Kelatha after the September 2007 demonstrations and sentenced him to 35 years in prison. U Kelatha reportedly was still in prison.

On January 17, 2009, authorities transferred U Gambira from Obo Prison in Mandalay to Hkamti Prison in Sagaing Division, which is approximately 1,200 miles north of Rangoon. U Gambira reportedly staged a hunger strike the week before. In November 2008 authorities convicted U Gambira of several charges, including offenses under the Electronics Transactions Act, Immigration Act, and Unlawful Associations Act. Officials sentenced him to 68 years in prison. Authorities had arrested him in November 2007 and his younger brother Ko Aung Kyaw Kyaw in October 2007. Both remained in prison.

In November 2008 the government handed down sentences to several activists, including monks. According to Human Rights Defenders and Promoters, authorities sentenced U Thadamma to two years’ imprisonment for alleged participation in the 2007 prodemocracy protests. In addition authorities sentenced six unnamed monks from Ngwe Kyar Yan Monastery to 11 and one-half years in prison. According to AAPP 13 monks from Ngwe Kyar Yan Monastery were still in prison.

In August 2008 authorities arrested monks U Damathara and U Nandara, both from the Thardu monastery in Rangoon. Officials did not acknowledge their arrests, although human rights observers believed they may have been detained as a precaution against future protests and that they were still in custody.

On March 30, 2008, the army arrested 11 Muslim community leaders in Maungdaw, Rakhine State. Among those arrested were the president of the Maungdaw District Myanmar Muslim League, U Than Tun (aka Muhammad Solin); community leader Hla Myint; and local businessman U Niramad. While authorities did not provide any explanation for the arrests, local residents reported to the media they believed the arrests were the result of the regime’s paranoia about alleged organized Muslim political activity in the area. It was believed that, except for Hla Myint, the leaders continued to be held at the end of the reporting period, although no information on their condition had been released.

Beginning in 2004 and continuing through the reporting period, a group of Buddhist laypersons known as the Tuesday Prayer Group attempted to gather every Tuesday at Rangoon’s Shwedagon Pagoda to pray for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Authorities sometimes used the pro-regime USDA to block the group from entering the pagoda grounds and make them pray outside the entrance or to shout and clap to drown out their prayers. In October 2009 authorities arrested Tuesday Prayer Group leader Naw Ohn Hla and three of her colleagues for offering alms to monks at Magwe monastery in Rangoon, alleging they acted with intent to incite public unrest. The four were sentenced in February 2010 to two years’ confinement each for “disturbing public tranquility.”

There continued to be credible reports from various regions that government officials compelled persons, Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike, especially in rural areas, to contribute money, food, or materials to state-sponsored projects to build, renovate, or maintain Buddhist religious shrines or monuments. The government denied that it used coercion and called these contributions “voluntary donations” consistent with Buddhist ideas of earning merit.

Forced Religious Conversion

Although authorities appear to have moved away from a campaign of forced conversion, there continued to be evidence that other means were being used to entice non-Buddhists to convert to Buddhism. During the previous reporting period, Chin Christians reported that local authorities operated a high school that only Buddhist students could attend and promised government jobs to the graduates. Christians had to convert to Buddhism to attend the school. An exile Chin human rights group claimed local government officials placed the children of Chin Christians in Buddhist monasteries, where they were given religious instruction and converted to Buddhism without their parents’ knowledge or consent. Reports suggested that the government also sought to induce members of the Naga ethnic group in Sagaing Division to convert to Buddhism through similar means. During the current reporting period, there were no reports of forced religious conversions.

Section III. Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom

Preferential treatment for Buddhists and widespread prejudice against ethnic South Asians, particularly ethnic Rohingya Muslims, were key sources of social tensions between the Buddhist majority and Christian and Muslim minorities. There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.

The government tightly controlled some private academic institutions and their curricula. Similar controls extended to Christian seminaries and Muslim madrassahs.

Section IV. U.S. Government Policy

The U.S. government continued to promote religious freedom in its contacts with all sectors of society as part of its overall policy to promote human rights. During the reporting period, U.S. embassy officials discussed the importance of increasing religious freedom with government and military authorities, private citizens, scholars, representatives of other governments, and international business and media representatives. Embassy representatives met regularly with leaders of Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, and Jewish religious groups, including ethnic minority religious leaders, members of the faculties of schools of theology, and other religiously affiliated organizations and NGOs.

Government restrictions on speech, press, assembly, and movement, including diplomatic travel, made it difficult to obtain timely and accurate information on violations of human rights, including freedom of religion. Information about abuses often becomes available only months or years after events, and it frequently was difficult or impossible to verify.

Through outreach and travel, when not blocked by regime officials, embassy representatives offered support to local NGOs and religious leaders and exchanged information with otherwise isolated human rights NGOs and religious leaders. Members of many ethnic and religious groups participated in English language and current events studies at the embassy’s American Center. The embassy regularly distributed U.S. government and NGO statements and reports on violations of religious freedom in the country. The U.S. government continued to support the UNHCR effort to convince the Ministry of Immigration and Population to issue TRCs, fairly and without bribes or other unreasonable requirements, to undocumented Rohingyas. In addition the embassy worked closely with Buddhist, Islamic, and Christian NGOs involved in education and teacher training.

The country has been designated a CPC since 1999 and most recently was redesignated on January 16, 2009. The U.S. government has a wide array of financial and trade sanctions in place against the country for violations of human rights. The passage and signing into law in 2008 of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese Junta Anti-Democratic Efforts (JADE) Act further strengthened these sanctions. The United States has opposed all international financial institution assistance to the government and urged the governments of other countries to take similar actions. U.S. sanctions included a ban on imports from the country, a ban on the export of financial services to the country, a ban on bilateral aid to the government, a ban on the export of arms to the country, and a suspension of Generalized System of Preferences benefits and Overseas Private Investment Corporation and U.S. Export-Import Bank financial services in support of U.S. investment and exports to the country. The U.S. government also ended active promotion of trade with the country, limited the issuance of visas to high-ranking government and military officials and their immediate family members, and froze SPDC assets in the United States. U.S. citizens have been prohibited from engaging in new investment activities in the country since 1997.

Topics: Sunni, Sunni, Protestant, Muslim, Jew, Hindu, Christian, Catholic, Buddhist, Baptist, Animist, Anglican, Freedom of religion, Religious minorities,

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Myanmar: Education on the run in east

Myanmar: Education on the run in east

OO KRAY KEE, 25 November 2010 (IRIN) – A chorus of children’s voices echo from the bamboo hut on the edge of Oo Kray Kee village in Myanmar’s Karen State. Nea Po Chee wants to be a teacher when she grows up. “I want to continue to study in grade five – if we have grade five here,” says the 14-year-old, whose education continues to be interrupted by Burmese government forces in eastern Myanmar.

“I need to learn more to be a teacher because I’d like my nation to become better educated.”

But as Nea Po Chee and 40 classmates finish their half-day of learning in the one-room school, ethnic Karen soldiers load their weapons in a nearby field preparing for another attack by Burmese troops.

Sixteen months ago, the village was bombed and burnt down by government soldiers, leaving the villagers with nothing more than a few personal belongings as they fled their homes.

Constant displacement due to attacks by Burmese troops has left generations of children without a proper formal education – let alone a normal childhood, say aid workers.

“Thousands of children are completely missing out on an education,” explains Sally Thompson, deputy executive director of the Thai Burmese Border Consortium (TBBC).

“In cases where they are on the run, the children often resort to learning in a jungle school which might simply be a blackboard set up under a tree, taught by older students.”

Displaced

In 2009, more than 110,000 villagers in eastern Myanmar were displaced by military action, according to the TBBC.

In the same area, between 2002 and the end of last year, more than 580,000 civilians, most of them children, were forced from their homes, the group said.

“I’d say there were as many as 30,000 persons displaced after the elections and many of them came across the border to the Thai side. In some parts of eastern Burma the education system has basically collapsed,” Thompson added.

Government spending on education and health is the lowest in the region at just 1.6 percent of Myanmar’s gross domestic product, a 2009 TBBC report, Protracted Displacement and Militarization in Eastern Burma, said.

Much of the area remains without basic infrastructure such as roads and electricity following fighting between the ethnic Karen National Union, which has been seeking independence for decades, and the military government.

In eastern Myanmar, fewer than half the children aged five to 13 attend school regularly, according to a 2010 report by the Karen Human Rights Group, which focuses on human rights violations in rural eastern Myanmar.

Children often drop out of school to scavenge for shelter and food.

Compounding problems further, in rural eastern Myanmar, more than 40 percent of children under five suffer from acute malnutrition, according to the Mae Tao Clinic, which operates an emergency medical centre in the Thai border town of Mae Sot.

Schools under fire

Attacks on schools remained a major concern last year, others say.

According to the Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, Burmese forces have occupied educational facilities for military purposes, recruited teachers and students for forced labour, and planted landmines close to or on the paths to schools.

The army has also reportedly set fire to whole villages – including schools – to prevent people from returning, the group says.

And as the danger for teachers increase, interest in working in the area decreases.

“We are scared of attacks from the SPDC [State Peace and Development Council government forces]. We have to move five or six times when our village comes under fire from the SPDC,” explains head instructor Eh Thwa. “Here the salary is very low, so many teachers are uninterested to work in such a difficult location.”

Meanwhile, there are no signs of the difficulties letting up, following the 7 November elections, described by many as a sham.

Fighting is expected to increase as many ethnic groups have refused to lay down their arms and join the government’s border guard forces.

Still, for Eh Thwa, there remains a glimmer of hope. “If the situation is good and we have peace and democracy, I think it will develop.”

But just one day after IRIN visited Oo Kray Kee, her one-room school was closed down and most of the village’s 300 residents were again on the run, living beneath plastic sheets in the jungle.

Theme (s): Conflict, Education,

[This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations]

Topics: Karen, Security situation, Military operations, Right to education, Resistance movements, Armed forces/military, Right to self-determination,

Myanmar: Border guard plan could fuel ethnic conflict

Myanmar: Border guard plan could fuel ethnic conflict

BANGKOK, 29 November 2010 (IRIN) – Efforts by Myanmar’s military government to incorporate that country’s numerous armed ethnic groups into a single border guard force will probably lead to further conflict and spawn an influx of refugees into neighbouring countries, analysts and aid workers warn.

Myanmar, with an estimated population of 57.6 million, is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Southeast Asia.

“Tensions are building as SPDC [government] troops are trying to control border crossings and incorporate the ethnic groups into a border guard force,” K’Nyaw Paw, an advocacy team leader of the Forum of Burma’s Community-Based Organizations, said. “We are preparing for more refugees as fighting can happen at any time.”

Under Myanmar’s military-drafted 2008 Constitution, all armed forces in the country must be placed under central military command – an ambitious undertaking in a country which has over a dozen armed ethnic groups (all but a handful of which have ceasefire agreements with the military government).

To achieve this, the regime has demanded that all of the ceasefire groups be incorporated into a Border Guard Force (BGF), which would entail disarming them, re-supplying them with government-issued weapons and making their troops subordinate to regional Myanmar military commanders.

To date, however, only two groups have agreed: the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the National Democratic Army-Kachin.

In August 2009, the refusal to join the BGF by one of the smallest ethnic factions in the country – the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army operating in the Kokang region of northern Shan State – resulted in a military offensive launched by government troops which led to more than 30,000 refugees fleeing over the border to China.

“The BGF is an indirect order [by the regime] for the ethnic groups to surrender their weapons,” said Zin Linn, a Burma analyst who lives in exile in Thailand.

“But without guns, the groups cannot defend their rights and their people so they will hold on to their guns until they gain autonomy and self-determination,” he said, adding that armed conflict will almost certainly break out and that refugees fleeing Burma will be “unavoidable”.

Earlier this month, fighting broke out between government forces and a breakaway faction of the DKBA which opposes the group’s decision to join the BGF.

On 7 November, the day of Myanmar’s general elections, DKBA troops of Brigade 5 stormed the town of Myawaddy on the Burmese-Thai border and took over several key positions. Fighting for control of the town the next day led to some 20,000 people fleeing into Thailand, while clashes further south resulted in some 5,000 more refugees.

Although most of these refugees were repatriated to Myanmar within days, some 2,000 remain in hiding on the Myanmar side of the frontier, according to K’Nyaw Paw. “It is very difficult to access and get supplies to these people,” she said.

Renewed fighting on 27-28 November between DBKA Brigade 5 troops and government forces has sent some 1,200 more refugees into Thailand, according to reports.

Fear of government offensives

Meanwhile, other groups such as the Kachin Independence Army and the United Wa State Army are preparing for possible military retaliation by the government for refusing to join the BGF, say analysts.

“Fearing that [government troops] may launch another offensive similar to that in Kokang, the major ceasefire groups along the border have been building up their forces,” states a recent report by the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think-tank. “These groups see their weapons as the last source of leverage in their long-running battle for autonomy with the military government.”

“Both the Kachin and Wa are recruiting troops, training, and collecting arms and ammunition,” said Linn. “They are preparing for war.”

Theme (s): Conflict, Early Warning, Refugees/IDPs,

[This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations]